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Abstract. In this paper, we propose an approach for measuring inconsistency in
inconsistent ontologies. We first define the degree of inconsistency of an inconsis-
tent ontology using a four-valued semantics for the description logic ALC. Then
an ordering over inconsistent ontologies is given by considering their inconsis-
tency degrees. Our measure of inconsistency can provide important information
for inconsistency handling.
1 Introduction
Real knowledge bases and data for Semantic Web applications will rarely be perfect.
They will be distributed and multi-authored. They will be engineered by more or less
knowledgeable people and often be created automatically from raw data. They will be
assembled from different sources and reused. Consequently, it is unreasonable to expect
such realistic knowledge bases to be always logically consistent, and methods for the
meaningful handling of such knowledge bases are being sought for.
Inconsistency has often been viewed as erroneous information in an ontology, but
this is not necessarily the best perspective on the problem. The study of inconsistency
handling in Artificial Intelligence indeed has a long tradition, and corresponding results
are recently being transferred to description logics, which underly OWL.
There are mainly two classes of approaches to dealing with inconsistent ontologies.
The first class of approaches is to circumvent the inconsistency problem by applying
a non-standard reasoning method to obtain meaningful answers [1, 2] – i.e. to ignore
the inconsistency in this manner. The second class of approaches to deal with logical
contradictions is to resolve logical modeling errors whenever a logical problem is en-
countered [3, 4].
However, given an inconsistent ontology, it is not always clear which approach
should be taken to deal with the inconsistency. Another problem is that when resolv-
ing inconsistency, there are often several alternative solutions and it would be helpful
to have some extra information (such as an ordering on elements of the ontology) to
decide which solution is the best one. It has been shown that analyzing inconsistency is
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helpful to decide how to act on inconsistency [5], i.e. whether to ignore it or to resolve
it. Furthermore, measuring inconsistency in a knowledge base in classical logic can
provide some context information which can be used to resolve inconsistency [6–8].
There are mainly two classes of inconsistency measures in classical logic. The first
class of measures is defined by the number of formulas which are responsible for an
inconsistency, i.e. a knowledge base in propositional logic is more inconsistent if more
logical formulas are required to produce the inconsistency [9]. The second class con-
siders the propositions in the language which are affected by the inconsistency. In this
case, a knowledge base in propositional logic is more inconsistent if more propositional
variables are affected by the inconsistency [6, 10]. The approaches belonging to the sec-
ond class are often based on some paraconsistent semantics because we can still find
models for inconsistent knowledge bases in paraconsistent logics.
Most of the work on measuring inconsistency is concerned with knowledge bases
in propositional logic. In [11], the authors generalized the work on measuring incon-
sistency in quasi-classical logic to the first-order case. However, it is not clear how
their approach can be implemented because there is no existing work on implementing
first-order quasi-classical logic.
At the same time, there are potential applications for inconsistency measures for
ontologies, as they provide evidence for reliability of ontologies when an inconsistency
occurs. In a scenario, where ontologies are merged and used together, such evidence
can be utilised to guide systems in order to arrive at meaningful system responses.
In this paper, we propose an approach for measuring inconsistency in inconsistent
ontologies. We first define the degree of inconsistency of an inconsistent ontology using
a four-valued semantics for description logic ALC. By analyzing the degree of incon-
sistency of an ontology, we can either resolve inconsistency if the degree is high (e.g.
greater than 0.7) or ignore it otherwise. After that, an ordering over inconsistent ontolo-
gies is given by considering their inconsistency degrees. We then can consider those
ontology which are less inconsistent and more reliable.
This paper is organized as follows. We first provide some basic notions in four-
valued description logic ALC in Section 2. Our measure of inconsistency is then given
in Section 3. Finally, we discuss related work and conclude the paper in Section 4.
2 Four-valued Models for ALC
We assume that readers are familiar with the description logic ALC [12]. An ALC
ontology is a pair (T ,A), where T is the set of class inclusions of the form C v D and
A is the set of individual assertions in the forms C(a) and R(a, b). We use LO to denote
the set of all concepts, roles and individuals used in O, and assume the cardinality of
LO is finite, which is acceptable for applications.We review the four-valued semantics
for ALC here, and see to [2] for details.
A four-valued interpretation (4-interpretation for short) is a pair I = (∆I , ·I) with
∆I as the domain, but ·I is a mapping which assigns to each concept C a pair 〈P,N〉
of subsets of ∆I , and each role R a pair 〈RP , RN 〉 of subsets of (∆I)2, such that
the conditions in Table 1 are satisfied, where proj+ and proj− are functions defined
Table 1. Semantics of ALC4 Concepts
Constructor Syntax Semantics
A AI = 〈P, N〉, where P, N ⊆ ∆I
R RI = 〈RP , RN 〉, where RP , RN ⊆ ∆I ×∆I
o oI ∈ ∆I
> 〈∆I , ∅〉
⊥ 〈∅, ∆I〉
C1 u C2 〈proj+(CI1 ) ∩ proj+(CI2 ), proj−(CI1 ) ∪ proj−(CI2 )〉
C1 t C2 〈proj+(CI1 ) ∪ proj+(CI2 ), proj−(CI1 ) ∩ proj−(CI2 )〉
¬C (¬C)I = 〈N, P 〉, if CI = 〈P, N〉
∃R.C 〈{x | ∃y, (x, y) ∈ proj+(RI) and y ∈ proj+(CI)},
{x | ∀y, (x, y) ∈ proj+(RI) implies y ∈ proj−(CI)}〉
∀R.C 〈{x | ∀y, (x, y) ∈ proj+(RI) implies y ∈ proj+(CI)},
{x | ∃y, (x, y) ∈ proj+(RI) and y ∈ proj−(CI)}〉
as follows: proj+〈P,N〉 = P, and proj+〈RP , RN 〉 = RP ; proj−〈P,N〉 = N, and
proj−〈RP , RN 〉 = RN .
Intuitively, the first element P (e.g. proj+(CI)) of the four-valued extension of a
concept C is the set of elements known to belong to the extension of C, while the sec-
ond element N (e.g. proj−(CI)) is the set of elements known to be not contained in the
extension of C. The intuition is similar for the semantics of roles.In order to reason with
inconsistency, we are free of these constrains, thus forming four epistemic states of the
individual assertions under an interpretation: (1) we know the individual is contained,
(2) we know the individual is not contained, (3) we have contradictory information,
namely that the individual is both contained in the concept and not contained in the
concept, (4)we have no knowledge whether or not the individual is contained. Next, we
use the four truth values {t, f, >̈, ⊥̈} from Belnap’s four-valued logic [13], which de-
note truth, falsity, contradiction, and incompleteness, respectively, to distinguish them.
Definition 1 For instances a, b ∈ ∆I , concept name C, and role name R:
CI(a) = t, iff aI ∈ proj+(CI) and aI 6∈ proj−(CI),
CI(a) = f, iff aI 6∈ proj+(CI) and aI ∈ proj−(CI),
CI(a) = >̈, iff aI ∈ proj+(CI) and aI ∈ proj−(CI),
CI(a) = ⊥̈, iff aI 6∈ proj+(CI) and aI 6∈ proj−(CI),
RI(a, b) = t, iff (aI , bI) ∈ proj+(RI) and (aI , bI) 6∈ proj−(RI),
RI(a, b) = f, iff (aI , bI) 6∈ proj+(RI) and (aI , bI) ∈ proj−(RI),
RI(a, b) = >̈, iff (aI , bI) ∈ proj+(RI) and (aI , bI) ∈ proj−(RI),
RI(a, b) = ⊥̈, iff (aI , bI) 6∈ proj+(RI) and (aI , bI) 6∈ proj−(RI).
By the correspondence defined above, we can define a four-valued interpretation in
terms of Table 1 or Definition 1. That is, the four-valued extension of a concept C can
be defined either as a pair of subsets of a domain or by claiming the the truth values for
each CI(a), where a ∈ ∆I .
Table 2. Semantics of inclusion axioms in ALC4
Axiom Name Syntax Semantics
inclusion C1 7→ C2 ∆I \ proj−(CI1 ) ⊆ proj+(CI2 )
concept assertion C(a) aI ∈ proj+(CI)
role assertion R(a, b) (aI , bI) ∈ proj+(RI)
As to the semantics of inclusion axioms, it is formally defined in Table 2 (together
with the semantics of concept assertions), which means that C v D is true under an
interpretation I if and only if for each individual which is not known to be not contained
in the extension of C, it must be known to belong to the extension of D.
We say that a four-valued interpretation I satisfies (a model of) an ontology O iff
I satisfies each assertion and each inclusion axiom in O. An ontology O is four-valued
satisfiable (unsatisfiable) iff there exists (does not exist) a model for O. In this paper,
we denote M4(O) as the set of four-valued models of an ontology O.
For an inconsistent ontology, it doesn’t have classical two-valued models, but it may
have four-valued models. For example, I = 〈{a}, ·I〉, under which AI = 〈{a}, {a}〉 is
a model of the ontology whose ABox = {A(a),¬A(a)} and whose TBox is empty.
However, an ontology does not always have four-valued model if top and bottom con-
cepts are both allowed as concept constructors. Take T = {> v ⊥} for example. For
any four-valued interpretation I , >I = 〈∆I , ∅〉 and ⊥I = 〈∅,∆I〉. T has no four-
valued model since (∆I \ proj−〈>I〉) = ∆I 6⊆ proj+〈⊥I〉 = ∅, where ∆I 6= ∅ for
DL interpretations. So in this paper we only consider the inconsistency measure of an
inconsistent ontology which has no > and ⊥ as concept constructors. Note that this
assumption is relatively mild, as > can always be replaced by A t ¬A.
3 Inconsistency Measure
In this section, we use four-valued models of inconsistent ALC ontologies to measure
their inconsistency degrees.
Definition 2 Let I be a four-valued model of an ontology O with domain ∆I , the in-
consistency set of I for O, written ConflictOnto(I,O), is defined as follows:
ConflictOnto(I,O) = ConflictConcepts(I,O) ∪ ConflictRoles(I,O),
where ConflictConcepts(I,O) = {A(a) | AI(a) = >̈, A ∈ LO, a ∈ ∆I}, and
ConflictRoles(I,O) = {R(a1, a2) | RI(a1, a2) = >̈, R ∈ LO, a1, a2 ∈ ∆I}
Intuitively, ConflictOnto(I, O) stands for the set of conflicting atomic individual asser-
tions. To define the degree of inconsistency, we still need following concepts.
Definition 3 For the ontology O and a 4-valued interpretation I ,
GroundOnto(I,O) = GroundConcepts(I,O) ∪ GroundRoles(I,O),
where GroundConcepts(I,O) = {A(a) | a ∈ ∆I , A ∈ LO} and GroundRoles(I,O) =
{R(a1, a2) | a1, a2 ∈ ∆I , R ∈ LO}
Intuitively, GroundOnto(I,O) is the collection of different atomic individual assertions.
In order to define the degree of inconsistency, we use an assumption that only inter-
pretations with finite domains are considered in this paper. This is reasonable in prac-
tical cases because only finite individuals can be represented or would be used. This is
also reasonable from the theoretical aspect because ALC has finite model property —
that is, if an ontology is consistent and within the expressivity of ALC, then it has a
classical model whose domain is finite.
Definition 4 The inconsistency degree of an ontology w.r.t. a model I ∈ M4(O),




That is, The inconsistency degree of O w.r.t. I is the ratio of the number of conflicting
atomic individual assertions divided by the amount of all possible atomic individual as-
sertions of O w.r.t. I . It measures to what extent a given ontology contains inconsistency
w.r.t. I .
Example 5 Consider Ontology O = (T ,A), where T = {A v B u ¬B},A =
{A(a)}. A model of O is as follows: I1 = (∆I1 , ·I1), where ∆I1 = {a}, AI1(a) = t,
and BI1(a) = >̈. For this model, GroundOnto(I1, O) = {A(a), B(a)}, and B(a) is
the unique element in ConflictOnto(I1, O). Therefore, IncI1(O) =
1
2 .
In [11], it has been shown that for a fixed domain, not all the models need to be
considered to define an inconsistency measure because some of them may overestimate
the degree of inconsistency. Let us go back to Example 5.
Example 6 (Example 5 Continued) Consider another model I2 of O: I2 = (∆I2 , ·I2),
where ∆I2 = {a}, AI2(a) = >̈, BI2(a) = >̈. I1 and I2 share a same domain. Since
|ConflictOnto(I2, O)| = |{B(a), A(a)}| = 2, we have I1 ≤Incons I2 by Definition
7. This is because ·I2 assigns contradiction to A(a). However, A(a) is not necessary
a conflicting axiom in four-valued semantics. Therefore, we conclude that IncI2(O)
overestimates the degree of inconsistency of O.
We next define a partial ordering on M4(O) such that the minimal elements w.r.t.
it are used to define the inconsistency measure for O.
Definition 7 (Model ordering w.r.t. inconsistency) Let I1 and I2 be two four-valued
models of ontology O such that |∆I1| = |∆I2|, we say the inconsistency of I1 is less than
or equal to I2, written I1 ≤Incons I2, if and only if IncI1(O) ≤ IncI2(O).
The condition |∆I1 | = |∆I2 | in this definition just reflects the attitude that only models
with the same cardinality of domain are comparative. As usual, I1 <Incons I2 denotes
I1 ≤Incons I2 and I2 6≤Incons I1, and I1 ≡Incons I2 denotes I1 ≤Incons I2 and
I2 ≤Incons I1. I1 ≤Incons I2 means that I1 is more consistent than I2.
The model ordering w.r.t. inconsistency is used to define the preferred models.
Definition 8 Let O be a DL-based ontology and n(n ≥ 1) be a given cardinality,
the preferred models w.r.t ≤Incons of size n, written PreferModeln(O), are defined as
follows:
PreferModeln(O) = {I | |∆I | = n;∀I ′ ∈M4(O), |∆I
′
| = n implies I ≤Incons I ′}
That is, PreferModeln(O) is the set of models of size n which are minimal w.r.t≤Incons.
The following theorem says that the cardinality of a domain is critical for measuring
the inconsistency degree of an ontology, while the element differences can be ignored.
Theorem 9 Let O be an ontology and n(≥ 1) be any given positive integer. Suppose
I1 and I2 are two four-valued models of O such that |∆I1 | = |∆I2 | = n, {I1, I2} ⊆
PreferModeln(O). The following equation always holds:
IncI1(O) = IncI2(O).
For simplicity of expression, we say an interpretation is well-sized if and only if
the cardinality of its domain is equal to or greater than the number of individuals in
O. Because of the unique name assumption of DL ALC, an interpretation can be a
model only if it is well-sized. Moreover, the following theorem asserts the existence of
preferred models among the well-sized interpretations.
Theorem 10 For any given ALC ontology O without concepts > and ⊥ in the lan-
guage, the preferred models among well-sized interpretations always exist.
Above we consider the inconsistency degrees of an ontology w.r.t. its four-valued
models, especially the preferred models. Now we define an integrated inconsistency
degree of an ontology allowing for different domains.
Definition 11 Given an ontology O and an arbitrary cardinality n(n ≥ 1), let In be
an arbitrary model in PreferModelsn(O). The inconsistency degree sequence of O, say
OntoInc(O), is defined as 〈r1, r2, ..., rn, ...〉, where rn = ModelInc(In, O) if In is well-
sized. Otherwise, let rn = ∗. We use ∗ as a kind of null value.
From theorem 9 and 10, the following property holds obviously.
Proposition 12 Assume O is an inconsistent ontology and OntoInc(O) = 〈r1, r2, ...〉,
and N is the number of individuals of O, then
ri =
{
∗ if 0 < i < N,
ri 6= ∗ and ri > 0 if i ≥ N.
This proposition shows that for an ontology, its inconsistency measure cannot be a
meaningless sequence — that is, each element is the null value ∗. Moreover, the non-
zero values in the sequence starts just from the position which equals to the number of
individuals in the ontology, and remains greater than zero in the latter positions of the
sequence.As for an example, we first measure an extreme inconsistent ontology.
Example 13 O = {C t ¬C v C u ¬C}. O is inconsistent. Obviously, for any four-
valued model I = 〈∆I , ·I〉 of O, C is assigned to 〈∆I ,∆I〉, so OntoInc(O) =
{1, 1, ...}.
After the inconsistency degree is defined for each ontology, we can use it to com-
pare two ontologies one of which is less inconsistent. The ordering over inconsistent
ontologies is defined as follows:
Definition 14 Given two ontologies O1 and O2. Suppose OntoInc(O1) = 〈r1, r2, ...〉
and OntoInc(O2) = 〈r′1, r′2, ...〉. We say O1 is less inconsistent than O2, written
O1 Incons O2, iff
rn ≤ r′n, for all n ≥ max{k, k′},
where k = min{i : ri 6= ∗}, k′ = min{j : r′j 6= ∗}.
According to proposition 12, Incons is well-defined. In Definition 14, we compare the
values from the position at which both sequences have non-null values because the null
value ∗ cannot reflect useful information about the inconsistency of the ontology.
To compare two ontologies with respect to the ordering Incons, by Definition
14, we have to compare two infinite sequences, which is practically very hard. When
designing an algorithm to compare two ontologies, we can set a termination condi-
tion in order to guarantee that an answer will be obtained. Suppose time (resource) is
used up and 〈r1, ..., rn〉 and 〈r′1, ..., r′m〉 are the already obtained partial sequences of
OntoInc(O) and OntoInc(O′), respectively. Then we can say that O is approximatively
less inconsistent than O′, denotes by O -Incons O′, if and only if ri ≤ r′i for all
1 ≤ i ≤ min{m,n}.
Example 15 (Example 5 continued) Each preferred model I of O must satisfy that
(1) it assigns one and only one individual assertion in {B(a), A(a)} to contradictory
truth value >̈ — that is, BI(a) = >̈ and A(a) = t, or BI(a) = t and A(a) = >̈;
(2) it assigns other grounded assertions to truth values among the set {t, f, ⊥̈}. So





Suppose O1 = {A v B u ¬B,A v C,A(a)}. In its preferred models, the in-
dividual assertions related to C are not involved with contradictory truth value, so




3n , ...}. By definition 14, O1 ≺Incons O, which means that
O1 has less inconsistency percent than O does.
4 Related Work and Conclusion
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first work which can distinguish descrip-
tion logic based ontologies in many levels considering their different inconsistency de-
grees instead of only 0/1. In this paper, we mainly spells out for ALC. The extension to
more expressive languages is direct by extending four-valued semantics for them.
Our work is closely related to the work of inconsistency measuring given in [11],
where Quasi-Classical models (QC logic [14]) are used as the underlying semantics. In
this paper, we use four-valued models for description logics as the underlying seman-
tics. This is because QC logic needs to translate each formula in the theory into prenex
conjunctive normal form (PCNF). We claim that this is not practical, especially for a
large ontology, because it may be quite time consuming and users probably do not like
their ontologies to be modified syntactically. In this paper, we can see that four-valued
models also provide us with a novel way to measure inconsistent degrees of ontologies.
It is also apparent that the inconsistency measure defined by our approach can be used
to compute each axiom’s contribution to inconsistency of a whole ontology by adapt-
ing the method proposed in [8], thereby providing important information for resolving
inconsistency in an ontology.
In [11], every set of formulae definitely has at least one QC model because neither
the constant predicate t (tautology) nor the constant predicate f (false) is contained
in the language. However, corresponding to t and f , the top concept > and bottom
concept ⊥ are two basic concept constructors for ALC. This requirement leads to the
possible nonexistence of four-valued models of an ALC ontology. Due to the space
limitation, we presume that the ontologies do not use > and ⊥ as concept constructors.
The discussion for an arbitrary inconsistent ontology will be left as future work.
For practical implementations, we suggest that a termination condition be used.
In the further work, we will work on some guidance on selecting such a termination
condition and on how to measure the trade-off between early termination and accuracy.
For the implementation of our approach, we are currently working on the algorithm,
which will be presented in a future paper.
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